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Essay
Time to Make Lemonade from the
Lemons of the Kelo Case
DWIGHT MERRIAM
The decision in Kelo v. New London only addressed the
constitutionality of the eminent domain process used to take Susette Kelo’s
home. Given the four corners of the case as presented to the Court, there
was no consideration of alternatives to eminent domain and of the equity
issues inherent in eminent domain. In responding to the essay by Horton
and Levesque the author looks to ways to enable development and
redevelopment through means less coercive than eminent domain and
more respectful of private property rights and the unique and personal
situations of those whose properties are targeted. The author, noting the
almost unbridled power of government in eminent domain takings and the
relative weakness of condemnees, offers suggestions to improve equity and
to allocate the true costs of direct takings. This Essay serves as a roadmap
for reform.
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Time to Make Lemonade from the
Lemons of the Kelo Case
DWIGHT MERRIAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
This commentary on Horton and Levesque had the potential to be the
shortest ever. On first reading I thought I might agree with nearly all they
had to say. They are, for the most part, spot on in describing the facts and
the litigation. The denouement, cleverly preserved for future use with the
four words (precedent, federalism, compensation, democracy) Horton
planted at the end of oral argument, is enlightening and entertaining, and
perpetuates the ability to argue the case long after the red light on the
lectern went dark. Witness here, more than a decade later, Horton
continues on in print.
It is what Horton and Levesque do not say that is of interest.1 They
describe the jurisprudence in a way that makes one think that, if a movie
were to be made about eminent domain, the Berman-Midkiff-Kelo2 refrain
would make a good sequel to Bill Murray’s Groundhog Day.3 As Horton
and Levesque claim, Kelo “is the correct decision based on the facts of the
case in the existing precedents . . . . Everyone should slow down, take a
deep breath, and conclude that the sky is not falling.”4
*
Dwight H. Merriam, FAICP, of the law firm of Robinson & Cole LLP, is a Fellow and Past
President of the American Institute of Certified Planners and Past Chair of the ABA Section of State
and Local Government Law. He has taught land use law at Vermont Law School, UConn Law School,
and Quinnipiac Law School, and has published over 200 articles and ten books, including co-editing
Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context (ABA 2006) and serving as co-editor of the leading
treatise in the field, Rathkopf’s Zoning and Planning Law and lead author of the casebook, Planning
and Control of Land Development. UMass BA (cum laude), UNC MRP, and Yale JD.
1
It is probably nothing more than the innocent narrowness of their perspective. As psychologist
Abraham Maslow said, “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat
everything as if it were a nail.” ABRAHAM MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1966). This is
probably based on philosopher Abraham Kaplan’s statement: “Give a small boy a hammer, and he will
find that everything he encounters needs pounding.” ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY
(1964). Horton and Levesque are among the most highly regarded appellate lawyers. They are not
urban planners, elected councilmembers, people whose homes are taken for redevelopment, developers,
or financiers.
2
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984);
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
3
GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993).
4
Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque, Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405,
1425 (2016).
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This is familiar territory for me, because I have studied property rights
and the Kelo case, co-authoring a book on the former5 and shortly after the
decision, co-editing a book on the latter.6 I did not represent any of the
parties in the case, but I did follow the build-up in the practice and
jurisprudence of eminent domain long before there was even a vision for
the Fort Trumbull development. I see missed opportunities in the decision
and its aftermath for planners; public officials; federal, state, and local
government; and the courts to improve the process of public land assembly
for the benefit of all the stakeholders. Eminent domain need not be a zero
sum game. At the very least it can be kinder and gentler. As a practitioner
observing the real world impacts of the Kelo decision in the decade since, I
am struck by how we have failed to learn much from the losses suffered on
all sides in this case and in the countless others like it, large and small, all
over this country.
Let us consider what Horton and Levesque did not say in describing
what those four words bring to the discussion of this case specifically and
eminent domain generally.
II. THE PRELUDE (“PRECEDENT”)
A. The Law
The prelude to Kelo is in the case law and practice of eminent domain
over many decades preceding it, and in what was and was not done in the
Fort Trumbull redevelopment itself. “Precedent” is the first of Horton’s
four words.7 Kelo did not change the law and is consistent with the
precedent of Berman and Midkiff.8 Agreed. But as the aphorism “two
wrongs don’t make a right” might instruct us, the consensus that no new
law was created in Kelo leaves us nowhere. Horton and Levesque are
correct in observing that Berman was broad in its language.9 In Berman the
plaintiffs’ perfectly good, non-blighted department store was wiped out in
the name of redevelopment.10 Berman should leave us asking, as so many
still do, how far governmental land assembly should be allowed to go in
taking properties that are not themselves in need of redevelopment but can
contribute to the assemblage value or be transformed into more lucrative

R. MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1999).
EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron
Ross eds., 2005). Mary Massaron Ross and I had the most fun in interviewing Wesley Horton and Scott
Bullock, who argued for Kelo. Our conversation became a chapter in the book and relates some
interesting back-stories. See id. at 291–320.
7
Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1414.
8
Id. at 1414–16.
9
Id. at 1415.
10
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30–31 (1954).
5
6
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uses in the fashion of a Motel 6 giving way to a Ritz Carlton.
Midkiff, sui generis perhaps given its unique facts coming from the
state which is the only former monarchy to join the union,12 probably does
go even further than Berman, as Horton and Levesque say.13 The idea was
to enable the breakup of the landowner oligopoly that was the consequence
of the feudal land system under the monarchy. The eminent domain
program of Midkiff did not succeed in doing what it was intended to do. It
made things worse by incorporating into the purchase of a home the entire
value of the fee interest in the underlying land, rather than enabling a
purchaser to buy just the improvements and pay a monthly rent on the
land.14 It has created a higher barrier to the entry into homeownership,
rather than facilitating it. Midkiff should make us ask whether we ought to
consider, and if so to what extent, the expectation of success before the
government is allowed to unleash its extraordinary power of eminent
domain to seize private property. The standard as to the probability of
success in the post-Kelo world, reiterating precedent, is that government
has no obligation to demonstrate to any degree that a redevelopment
project will succeed. Government does not even have to mouth the words.
The trial record in Kelo includes the admission by the developer that there
was essentially no market for building in the area.15
11

B. The Process
What Horton and Levesque do not address is the process itself and
what could have and should have been done differently. This is the
precedent of the public policy and process of deciding when and how to
use eminent domain that has been perpetuated post-Kelo. It deserves close
scrutiny and should not be accepted simply because that has been the way
that business was always done, apparently ratified by Kelo. For some
backstory, read Jeff Benedict’s somewhat one-sided book, Little Pink
11
For a succinct criticism of the decision, see Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of
Berman v. Parker, 42 URBAN LAW. 287 (2009).
12
Prior to joining the United States as a territory under an American governor and, eventually, a
state, Hawaii was a monarchy. See JAMES L. HALEY, CAPTIVE PARADISE: A HISTORY OF HAWAII, at
xix (2014) (showing the kings and queens of Hawaii).
13
Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1416.
14
See J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND
MATERIALS 221 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing social redistribution as a public use: “Both Midkiff and
Berman v. Parker are examples of social redistribution. In Midkiff, title to land was taken from its
owners and transferred to Lessees . . . Title transfers have occurred under this statute upheld in Midkiff,
but housing costs have increased because homeowners must now pay for a full title rather than monthly
rental under a lease. Note that Justice O’Connor acknowledged the act might not be successful in
achieving its intended goals.”).
15
“The trial court relied on testimony that ‘market conditions do not justify construction of new
commercial space . . . on a speculative basis.’” Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 598 (Conn.
2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S. at 490 (2005).
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House. The take-away from his account is that Susette Kelo and her
neighbors, some of whom, when you learn their stories, you will find even
more sympathetic than Kelo, is that they were treated poorly in the
process.17 The next media play for this case is the upcoming movie in
which Catherine Keener portrays Susette Kelo.18 The Kelo case just keeps
on giving.19
16

III. WHY THE HURRY?
If you follow the history of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment process,
you will sense that there was great urgency to acquire and clear the
property that drove the process.20 Why? In part, the real estate market was
strong and the redevelopment authority had a capable developer waiting in
the wings.21 The other factor is a phenomenon of redevelopment generally:
the almost obsessive-compulsive urge to own, control, clear, and make
16
JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE (2009); see
also Dahlia Lithwick, Driven Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/
books/review/Lithwick-t.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TW6G-S8ZH] (“The investigative reporter Jeff
Benedict has decided to cast Kelo in the style of Julia Roberts as Erin Brockovich. But this comes at
some journalistic cost: by the time he’s finished introducing us to his protagonist (who ‘had a body that
defied the fact that she had delivered five children. Her fiery red hair ran all the way down to her
waist’), he risks having written the world’s first bodice-ripper about the takings clause.”).
17
BENEDICT, supra note 16.
18
Brian Hallenbeck, ‘Pink House’ Author Tickled at Casting of Movie’s Lead Role, THE DAY
(Sept. 17, 2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.theday.com/article/20150917/NWS01/150919356 [https://perm
a.cc/W9SQ-64X4]; see also Ilya Somin, Forthcoming Film About Kelo v. City of New London, WASH.
POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/aforthcoming-documentary-on-kelo-v-city-of-new-london/ [https://perma.cc/9AC8-KDFL]. The film’s
producers, Ted Balaker and Courtney Balaker, are making it in collaboration with the Institute for
Justice, which represented Kelo, and they had this to say in an op-ed piece in USA Today:

The Constitution once limited how governments could use eminent domain, but
post-Kelo, that’s no longer the case. Officials routinely lock arms with corporations
or billionaires to forcibly transfer property from one private owner to another, not
for public use, but for private gain. . . . How to tame the ugly spirit of eminent
domain abuse and cronyism? We suggest turning to a force mightier than politics:
culture. We are producing a feature film based on Kelo’s historic saga, and we hope
to achieve some of the impact garnered by Erin Brockovich, another underdog film
about a real-life working-class woman.
Id.
19
A video embedded in a report on the upcoming movie is interesting because not only is the
landmark Thames River mispronounced, a local oddity for sure, but more importantly the interviewee
director Courtney Balaker mistakenly believes a finding of blight was required. Nick Gillespie &
Alexis Garcia, Kelo Decision Coming to Big Screen in Little Pink House, REASON.COM (July 27,
2015), http://reason.com/reasontv/2015/07/27/kelo-decision-little-pink-house [https://perma.cc/2HSDLQ2L].
20
See Ted Mann, A ‘Wrong Turn’: From Giddy Optimism to Stunning Disappointment, THE DAY
(Nov. 11, 2009, 2:06 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20091111/BIZ02/311119888 [https://per
ma.cc/SK2Y-3L7H] (discussing the history of the Fort Trumbull development process).
21
YALE URBAN DESIGN WORKSHOP, FORT TRUMBULL VISION 15 (2011).
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shovel-ready now, right now, any redevelopment site, with four corners,
neat and square.22 The current interest in new urbanism, mixed use, and
retention of the historic fabric,23 all militate against the 1960’s ethic of
“slash and burn” redevelopment.24
What was striking to me as I followed the development of the case was
not the treatment of Susette Kelo so much as that of Wilhelmina Dery.25
She was among the nine residents and investment owners of the fifteen
homes that were petitioners in the case. She lived in a house on Walbach
Street that her family had owned for more than 100 years.26 She was born
there, in that house, on February 20, 1918, and in 1946 her husband,
Charles, moved into that house when they married.27 Wilhelmina and
Charles Dery’s son, also a petitioner, lived next door in a house given to
him as a wedding gift.28 Wilhelmina Dery lived on through the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court but died on March 13, 2006, nine months after the
Court’s decision, in the very room where she was born.29
Today, a decade after she died, the site remains undeveloped.30 We
can argue why it is in that condition. Certainly, the Great Recession may
have been sufficient to stop the development. But here is the real
question—why even at the time of the taking, with a hopeful future, was it
necessary to immediately take the fee simple interest of Wilhelmina and
Charles Dery? They were in their eighties when their property was taken.
Why was it not possible to take just the remainder interest in their property
and leave them with a life estate, with the ability to stay on in the house
were Wilhelmina had been born, until they both died or decided on their
own that they needed to move on? Horton and Levesque say nothing about
22
See VIRGINIA LEE BURTON, MIKE MULLIGAN AND HIS STEAM SHOVEL (1939). And look where
Mary Anne, the steam shovel, ended up after furiously digging a basement with four corners, neat and
square.
23
See, e.g., Principles of Urbanism, NEW URBANISM, www.newurbanism.org/newurbanism/
principles.html [https://perma.cc/XBE7-LS92] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); CONGRESS FOR NEW
URBANISM, www.cnu.org [https://perma.cc/NXE9-MCP9] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
24
See, e.g., Sharon Zukin, Gentrification as Market and Place, in THE GENTRIFICATION
DEBATES: A READER 37, 40 (Japonica Brown-Saracino ed., 2010) (“For a long time, demolition
signified improvement.”).
25
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494–95 (2005).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Lynne Tuchy, Fort Trumbull Plaintiff Dies, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 15, 2006),
http://articles.courant.com/2006-03-15/news/0603150758_1_takings-wilhelmina-dery-new-london-sfort-trumbull [https://perma.cc/SX77-JCGR].
30
Ilya Somin, The Story Behind Kelo v. City of New London—How an Obscure Takings Case
Got to the Supreme Court and Shocked the Nation, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelocase-how-an-obscure-takings-case-came-to-shock-the-conscience-of-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/AK
X2-PJKM].
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how we might make the process kinder and gentler for those who might
suffer the greatest from having their property taken, suffering in ways that
can never be compensated for money alone. For eight years, Wilhelmina
lived with the cloud of the eminent domain taking over her head.
Not every building needs to be taken to make every redevelopment
work. Remarkably, there was one building, one that was not blighted, that
somehow did not become part of any of the area plans, and was not taken.
That was the Italian Dramatic Club at 79 Goshen Street in Parcel 3.31 Early
in the week that the case was to be argued in the U.S. Supreme Court,
Professor Richard A. Epstein and Professor J. Peter Byrne discussed the
case, with Professor Epstein offering this about the Italian Dramatic Club:
This case illustrates the corrupt (or at least monumentally
stupid) decisions that local governments can make. Virtually
all of the 90 acres are already in public hands. The mess-up
with the hotel which was supposed to serve the Pfizer plant
has nothing to do with Susette Kelo and company. It reflects
an ossified public process that moves so slowly that Pfizer
has found other places to house people who use its facility.
The park and remediation of an extravagant scale can take
place without condemning these homes. The Italian Dramatic
Club lies in the middle of this supposed flood plain and yet is
spared, while the Brelesky house that abuts it is taken
over. . . . Peter, you speak about the need to assemble large
contiguous plots of land. But this the City already has with
over 90 acres in hand and it can’t figure out what to do with
them because the local economy doesn't support its grandiose
ambitions. Yet when politics intervene, it will craft a
convenient exception from the grim urban reaper. Hence the
Italian Dramatic Club is spared from condemnation when the
Brelesky house that abuts it is not.32
If the club could be preserved, and one might ask to what end, why
couldn’t the Derys be allowed to retain a life estate and have the
government only take the remainder interest? And why couldn’t the
development plan work around some or all of the holdouts and integrate
them into the redevelopment plan? The same question might be asked with
regard to Berman’s non-blighted department store: Why could it not have
31
Tom Blumer, Nearly 10 Years Later, Monument to Favoritism in Kelo Ruling Still Stands,
MRC NEWSBUSTERS (Jan. 7, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/tom-blumer/2009/
01/07/nearly-10-years-later-monument-favoritism-kelo-ruling-still-stands
[https://perma.cc/UV3CPK6L].
32
Richard A. Epstein & J. Peter Byrne, Can Your Town Take Your Home?, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Feb.
21, 2005), http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_emdom0205.msp [https://perma.cc/6S
KJ-GMVB].
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been integrated as part of a mixed-use development instead of destroying it
to make way for a monoculture of residential uses?
IV. EMPOWERMENT
The sense you get from Benedict’s description of the property owners
is their relative lack of power in the face of the government’s plan. Most
property owners have little or no bargaining power against the government.
They justifiably feel overpowered, which they are, when the government
says it wants and will have their property. Horton admitted as much during
oral argument: “The large share of it was [voluntarily sold], but of course,
that’s because there is always in the background the possibility of being
able to condemn it. I mean, that obviously facilitates a lot of voluntary
sales.”33 When they do fight, as they did here, they might be accused of
causing the project’s failure, as Horton and Levesque argue in saying that
“without drawn-out litigation the plan might actually have succeeded!”34
What to do? Maybe we should experiment with civil Gideon
protection35 and provide by statute for the cost of free representation for
property owners who cannot otherwise afford a lawyer to represent them in
the negotiation and, if necessary, in the litigation of eminent domain
takings. Maybe for those who can afford lawyers, there might be an
attorney’s fees provision in every case, not just those where, as in some
states, the property gets an award significantly above that offered by the
government.36 Property owners might have the right to submit their legal
costs to the court or be reimbursed by the government if the cases are
settled short of trial. Should not the cost of representation of property
owners be a part of the public’s obligation when there is a forced assembly,
with the burden spread over all of the benefitted citizens instead of being
borne solely by the private property owners?
More likely of adoption and already proven to be successful is the
property rights ombudsman. The ombudsman, an employee of the state,
provides information and guidance for private property owners whose
33

108).

Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-

Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1410.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally Civil Gideon Corner,
PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/CivilGideon [https://perma.cc/
M9U8-VUYZ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (“The term ‘civil Gideon’ refers to a growing national
movement that has developed to explore strategies to provide legal counsel, as a matter of right and at
public expense, to low-income persons in civil legal proceedings where basic human needs are at stake,
such as those involving shelter and child custody.”); John Pollock, It’s All About Justice: Gideon and
the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 39 HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2013; Moving Towards Civil Gideon: 2014
Legal Assistance Partnership Conference, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (2014), https://
www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=51554 [https://perma.cc/EB6F-EX43].
36
See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 701 (Consol. 2016).
34
35
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property is proposed to be taken. They provide some empowerment for the
private property owners. Regrettably, they have been little used. Utah,
Missouri, and Virginia appear to be the only states with eminent domain or
property rights ombudsmen.37 Connecticut had one for a few years but it
was eliminated, ostensibly for budget reasons.38
Utah’s program39 is exemplary. The state’s description reads:
The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman protects the
property rights of the citizens of Utah. The Office helps
citizens and government agencies understand and comply
with property rights laws, resolves property rights disputes,
and advocates for fairness and balance when private rights
conflict with public needs.40
Neither the Utah nor Missouri ombudsmen appear to be on short
leashes.41 For example, on a page with photographs of many fine looking
single-family homes, the Missouri ombudsman says:
Do you think your home is safe from eminent domain abuse?
So did these Missouri homeowners. These are just a few
37
STATE OF MISSOURI, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (last visited Mar. 21,
2016); Press Release, Virginia Department of Transportation, VDOT Announces Establishment of
Ombudsman Function to Assist Public with Right of Way Transactions (June 24, 2014) (on file with
author).
38
Annual Report 2007–2008, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS,
http://www.ct.gov/pro/lib/pro/documents/annual_report_2007-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZZ3-DDH5]
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016); Annual Report 2008–2009, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY
RIGHTS, http://www.ct.gov/pro/lib/pro/documents/annual_report_2008-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KWT
-4MSC] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016); Connecticut Office of Ombudsman for Property Rights Closes,
OWNER’S COUNSEL OF AMERICA (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.ownerscounsel.com/connecticut-officeof-ombudsman-for-property-rights-closes/ [https://perma.cc/4E5T-QA96]. There was a mediation
process as well. Process of Mediation of Disputes Between Property Owners and Public Agencies
Concerning the Use of Eminent Domain or Related Relocation Assistance, OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, http://www.ct.gov/sots/lib/sots/regulations/title_48/052.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DFC6-QCQ6] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
39
UTAH DEP’T OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN, WELCOME TO
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN UTAH DEP’T OF COMMERCE (last visited Mar. 21, 2016),
http://propertyrights.utah.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZRM3-YEME].
40
Id.
41
Virginia’s is within its Department of Transportation and it is unclear how independently it
operates. Right of Way Ombudsman Charter, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ASSURANCE AND COMPLIANCE OFFICE (2014), http://www.virginiadot.org/business/resources/Right_of
_Way_Ombudsman_Charter_061114.pdf [https://perma.cc/B29W-RZAZ]. Missouri’s law does not
allow the ombudsman to give legal advice: “The office of public counsel shall create an office of
ombudsman for property rights by appointing a person to the position of ombudsman. The ombudsman
shall assist citizens by providing guidance, which shall not constitute legal advice, to individuals
seeking information regarding the condemnation process and procedures. The ombudsman shall
document the use of eminent domain within the state and any issues associated with its use and shall
submit a report to the general assembly on January 1, 2008, and on such date each year thereafter.” MO.
ANN. STAT. § 523.277 (2016).
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examples of the many homes that are considered part of a
“blighted” area in an attempt by condemning authorities to
strip these homeowners of their property rights in order to
build strip malls.42
Utah law requires that any agency intending to use eminent domain to
acquire private property provide the property owner with certain
disclosures,43 all of which can be found in a 46-page document, “Your
Guide to Just Compensation: What to Do When The Government Wants to
Acquire Land” promulgated by the Utah Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman.44 Those disclosures are laid out in twenty-seven
paragraphs,45 including the right to fair market value,46 access to public
documents,47 open meetings,48 disclosure of other property owners whose
property is being taken,49 a statement of the public purpose for the taking, 50
and the right to accompany the agency’s appraiser during his or her
inspection of the property and to talk to that appraiser before the value is
determined.51 In addition, homeowners have a right to receive a copy of the
appraisal.52 A second appraisal may be provided at the agency’s expense if
the property owner has requested mediation through the office of the
property rights ombudsman and the mediator or arbitrator in the matter
makes the determination that such an appraisal is reasonably necessary to
resolve the issue of just compensation.53 The Utah law allows supplemental
damages beyond fair market value for improvements on the property that
contribute to the value and to have the agency provide a replacement
dwelling, including an obligation to pay additional compensation where the
just compensation offered is insufficient to pay for an appropriate
replacement.54
Craig Call, Utah’s first property rights ombudsman, offered an
insider’s, first-person perspective on how this has worked in Utah.55 The
42
Blighted Missouri, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS, https://eminentdom
ain.mo.gov/blighted.htm [https://perma.cc/RA55-8HPU] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
43
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-505 (2016).
44
Your Guide to Just Compensation, STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
OMBUDSMAN (2011), https://utahpropertyrights.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/your-guide-to-just-compnov-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJE6-96L3].
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-511 (2016).
55
Craig M. Call, Speech from the Eighth Annual New York Conference on Private Property
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short version is that it has worked very well to bring the parties to
settlement and avoid litigation. With the ombudsman and new techniques
for alternative dispute resolution, the Utah Department of Transportation
reports that litigation has been reduced 75%.56 That is not a typographic
error – a 75% reduction in litigation. The budget is small, just $150,000
year in 2004,57 and the office even has the power to pay for independent
appraisals.58 A state that does not have a property rights ombudsman is
pennywise and pound-foolish.
V. COURT’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY GUIDES OR STANDARDS
Horton and Levesque end their discussion of the first of the four words
by noting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion with what is as close to
any real guidance on what standards must characterize the process in order
for it to be defensible.59 The most that one can glean from the concurrence
is that there must be a plan, an adequate process, and the ability to vote the
elected officials who make eminent domain decisions out of office at some
later time.60
In perpetuating the precedential status quo, the Court did nothing to
provide guidance for better decision-making. Everyone affected by
eminent domain deserves better. The Court passed up an opportunity to
adopt the clear thinking of the Michigan Supreme Court in Wayne County
v. Hathcock, where that court overturned its 1981 “Poletown” ruling and
held that a “public use” must be for just that, a use by the public such as a
park, an airport, or a highway.61
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the city of Detroit’s
condemnation of a substantial area of private, largely residential property
to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation to construct an automobile

Rights, PROP. RTS. FOUND. OF AM. (2004), http://prfamerica.org/speeches/8th/UtahPropRtsOmbuds
man.html [https://perma.cc/KBG9-KJ7H].
56
Craig M. Call, Resolving Land Use and Impact Fee Disputes: Utah’s Innovative Ombudsman
Program, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/real_property_trust_estate/annu
al_meeting/2011/materials/annual_rpte_2011_property_rights_call_utah_ombudsman_program.authch
eckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9BK-3F7Z] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016); Leonard Gilroy, States Should
Establish Ombudsmen to Protect Private Property Rights, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2008),
http://reason.org/news/show/states-should-establish-ombuds
[https://perma.cc/372Y-KQSR];
Ombudsman Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/model-policy/ombudsman-act/
[https://perma.cc/79F5-5HRV] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
57
Call, supra note 55.
58
Id.
59
Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1418.
60
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 492 (2005).
61
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004); Patricia E. Salkin, Zoning
and Land Use Planning: Michigan Supreme Court Overturns Eminent Domain Case, 33 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 478 (2005).
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assembly plant in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit. The Court
said: “The power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance primarily
to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment
and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The benefit to a
private interest is merely incidental.”63 The takings included over 1,000
properties, and the homes of 3,438 people.64
Hathcock arose out of the County Airport renovation in which Wayne
County had invested about $2 billion and was then faced with problems
related to increased aircraft noise.65 The county started buying up land
using among other funds $21 million provided by the Federal Aviation
Administration, acquiring about 500 acres in many parcels near the
airport.66 Some of the parcels were not connected with any others.67
Because the county was required to use the federal funds for economic
development it proposed a business and technology park as part of the
airport project.68 The site for the proposed business and technology park
was large, some 1,300 acres.69 To get that much land the county started
buying up more property totaling another 500 acres.70 The county came up
short, however, in terms of getting a sufficiently contiguous land
62

62
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981), overruled by
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765.
63
Id. at 459. The court had noted, “We are persuaded the terms [public use and public purpose]
have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean
concept of public benefit.” Id. at 457. Professor John Mogk of Wayne State University describes
Poletown as a success:

The city acquired land for General Motors in Detroit’s declining Poletown
neighborhood through eminent domain in the 1980s to build a $2 billion autoassembly plant that today is the largest operating industrial facility in the city and
one of GM’s flagship plants. It has provided 3,000 jobs in the community and
15,000 additional allied jobs in parts and service industries for more than three
decades, and generated hundreds of millions of dollars of property and income-tax
revenue, more than accomplishing its economic purpose.
John E, Mogk, Eminent Domain’s Poletown Success, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eminent-domains-poletown-success-1438726651 [https://perma.cc/NC648MF6]. But see Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit,
28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651 (2005) (arguing that overturning Poletown “vindicate[d] an important
legal principle to protect people from what the founding fathers called ‘the mischiefs of faction’”
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison))).
64
See Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 48 (2003); Stephen Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent
Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth
Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 295 (2000).
65
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 771.
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assemblage, so it begin a formal process of eminent domain, negotiating
voluntary sales from twenty-seven of the property owners, leaving 19 to be
acquired by eminent domain.71 Those takings were challenged as not being
for a public purpose.72 The trial and appellate courts upheld the use of
eminent domain for this assemblage, finding precedent in the Poletown
decision.73
In reversing Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged
that its state constitution did not preclude the transfer of property taken by
eminent domain to a private entity but that such transfer was not
permissible if it was for a private use.74 And it is here that the Hathcock
decision is instructive of the analysis that the U.S. Supreme Court could
have followed in Kelo and which would have provided far better guidance
than what was offered and what Horton and Levesque can fabricate out of
Kennedy’s concurrence.
The Michigan court first held that Wayne County was authorized to
exercise the power of eminent domain and that this particular exercise was
within the county’s powers.75
A transition from a declining rustbelt economy to a growing,
technology-driven economy would, no doubt, promote
prosperity and general welfare. Consequently, the county’s
goal of drawing commerce to metropolitan Detroit and its
environs by converting the subject properties to a state-ofthe-art technology and business park is within this definition
of a “public purpose.”76
The court also found it was “necessary”77 and “for the use or benefit of
the public”78 under the state’s statutes.
In ultimately determining that the proposed condemnations were not
“for public use” under the Michigan constitution,79 the court found that it
should apply what is the “common understanding” of the term, quoting
Justice Cooley: “[The] Constitution is made for the people and by the
people. The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable
minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it.”80
What followed next in the analysis and the decision is a remarkable
Id.
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 787.
75
Id. at 776.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 777.
78
Id. at 778.
79
Id. at 781.
80
Id. at 779 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1971)).
71
72
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road map for eminent domain decision-making where the property is
ultimately turned over to a private entity for redevelopment. The court
described its challenge as one of finding “the area between these poles” –
the permissible condemnation of private property ultimately conveyed to a
private entity for a public use and that which is ultimately conveyed to a
private entity for private use.81
First, the court noted the precedent in Michigan to the conveyance to a
private entity must be one of “public necessity of the extreme sort
otherwise impracticable,”82 citing a prior decision describing “those
enterprises generating public benefit whose very existence depends on the
use of land that can be assembled only by the coordination central
government alone is capable of achieving” and including “highways,
roads, canals, and other instrumentalities.”83
This notion of the necessity of collective action to acquire property for
the “instrumentalities of commerce” would not necessarily preclude the
acquisition of the properties at Fort Trumbull, but would require a
demonstration that it was absolutely necessary to carry out the public
purpose.
The second requirement that the court noted as necessary where
condemned property is transferred to a private entity is that there be some
continuing public oversight, some involvement or control by the public.84
This too would not have been a problem at Fort Trumbull if the acquired
property were subject to long-term or perpetual covenants and easements
with a reverter back to the government in the event that the private
developer failed to use the property for a public use.85 Indeed, the
increasing use of public-private partnerships enables government to stay
involved as a partner with private entities managing and controlling the use
of the land that is acquired while insuring continuing dedication to public
use. Remember, ownership, even control, is not necessarily the same as
use.
Finally, the Michigan court found that it was permissible to transfer
property to a private entity when the land acquired was itself a matter of
public concern, as would be the case for the removal of blighted properties
that are a hazard to the public's health and safety.86 The ultimate transfer of
the land acquired under these conditions to a private entity is incidental to
Id. at 781.
Id. (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich.
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
83
Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
84
Id. at 782.
85
See id. at 784 (describing how no formal mechanisms existed to ensure that the Pinnacle Project
benefited the public). Had some mechanism existed, the court would have ruled differently on this
element.
86
Id. at 782–83.
81
82
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the removal of the blight.
The Michigan Supreme Court essentially adopted Justice Ryan’s
dissenting opinion in the Poletown case in summarizing its three-part test
as follows:88
87

The foregoing indicates that the transfer of condemned
property to a private entity, seen through the eyes of an
individual sophisticated in the law at the time of ratification
of our 1963 Constitution, would be appropriate in one of
three contexts: (1) where “public necessity of the extreme
sort” requires collective action; (2) where the property
remains subject to public oversight after transfer to a private
entity; and (3) where the property is selected because of
“facts of independent public significance,” rather than the
interests of the private entity to which the property is
eventually transferred.89
The proposed business and technology park failed this three-part test.
First, there was ample opportunity for a similar development in the area. 90
Second, there was no public oversight.91 Third, the acquisition of the land,
in and of itself, did not serve the public good because there was no
“independent public significance” such as the elimination of a hazard that
would support the use of the eminent domain power.92
The Hathcock decision came down on July 30, 2004, just eleven
months before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo.93 How much
better the Kelo decision would have been had a similar thorough,
thoughtful analysis been followed and more definitive guidance given to
decision makers. Would the Fort Trumbull project still have been held to
be for a public purpose? No one should dismiss Hathcock by saying that it
is a state court decision interpreting state statutes and a state constitution.94
Id. at 783.
Id. at 781 (citing Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478–80 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
89
Id. at 783.
90
Id. at 783–84.
91
Id. at 784.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 765; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
94
In 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court compared Kelo and Hathcock, noting the more protective
Michigan constitution:
87
88

Compare, for example, Kelo v. New London . . . with Wayne Co. v. Hathcock . . . .
Kelo held that the requirement of U.S. Const., Ams. V and IX that eminent domain
be exercised for a “public use” was satisfied when the city sought to condemn
property and transfer it to private entities upon a showing that the transfer would
create an economic benefit to the community; essentially, the government can “take”
private property when the taking advanced a “public purpose.” In contrast, Hathcock
held that the requirement of Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2 that eminent domain be
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That is not the point. Hathcock is simply a good example of an in-depth,
carefully articulated analysis, something the U.S. Supreme Court did not
do.
VI. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE—LAND ASSEMBLY
The principal argument for eminent domain for redevelopment is that
it is absolutely necessary when private parties are unable to assemble
sufficient contiguous land to make an economic project.95 Horton and
Levesque do not mention private land assembly, sometimes called land
readjustment, as an alternative to eminent domain. Remarkably absent
from all of the reaction to Kelo has been any initiative to develop the law
in this country to facilitate private land assembly. In other countries,
among them Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Netherlands, and
Australia, there are “land readjustment” systems enabling entrepreneurs,
developers, and groups of property owners to come together, to assemble
land.96 In doing so, they can capture the assemblage value that is not
compensable when property is taken by public eminent domain and
monetize it when they sell the assemblage to a developer or participate in
some capacity such as limited partners, stockholders, or members of a
corporation.97 If there are holdouts, their properties can be taken.
Generally, the process begins with the individual property owners
approving the land readjustment plan and then giving up their properties.98
One knowledgeable commentator has advocated a process of land
assembly that begins with assembling the landowners, working with them
to find the shared goals and objectives and developing an approach that is a
true public-private partnership.99 A variation on this concept is the
exercised for “public use” was violated when the county sought to condemn
property and transfer it to private entities in order to facilitate economic
development. We explained that the public-use requirement forbids the forced
transfer of private property to a private entity for a private use and held that
economic benefit to a community, without more, did not constitute a “public use,”
even though it could be construed as a “public purpose.”
Aft Michigan v. Michigan, 866 N.W.2d 782, 794 n.9 (Mich. 2015) (citations omitted).
95
E.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781–82 (describing a hypothetical scenario where the use of
eminent domain is necessary to complete public projects).
96
ROBERT H. NELSON & EILEEN NORCROSS, MERCATUS CENTER, MOVING PAST KELO: A NEW
INSTITUTION FOR LAND ASSEMBLY—COLLECTIVE NEIGHBORHOOD BARGAINING ASSOCIATIONS
(CNBAS), at 6–10 (2009).
97
Lynne B. Sagalyn, Land Assembly, Land Readjustment, and Public-Private Redevelopment, in
ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 159, 170 (Yu-Hung
Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007).
98
See George W. Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB.
LAW. 1, 2 (2000) (describing the beginning steps of a land readjustment plan).
99
Frank Schnidman, Land Assembly by Assembling People, 30 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1, 3
(2007).
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collective neighborhood bargaining association to negotiate for the
neighborhood and extract the assemblage value.100 He identifies George
Washington as the first real land readjustment entrepreneur in America in
assembling seventeen large farm tracts to create the nation’s capital.101
Washington negotiated an agreement dated March 30, 1791, by which the
land owners conveyed with charge portions of their land needed for streets,
parks, and similar public uses and sold additional land at $57 an acre for
government buildings and in return they received building lots laid out by
the government and apportioned between the private land owners and the
Federal government.102 No eminent domain.103
Private land assembly is extremely difficult without enabling
legislation to address the issue of holdouts. When successful, the rewards
for all the stakeholders can be great, as they were in the New York City
42nd Street Development Project.104 Many land assembly attempts,
however, fail.
Back in the mid-1990s, not far from the University of Connecticut
School of Law, there was an attempt by a private land developer working
with a group of neighbors across from Westfarms Mall, on the border of
West Hartford and Farmington, to assemble the lots in a 1960s era
subdivision of split-level homes known as Astronaut Village105 into a
parcel large enough for a retail project. Neighborhood opposition
overwhelmed the developer attempting the land assembly. It was an illconsidered attempt but illustrative of the challenges, especially when the
initiative comes from outside.106
VII. ASSEMBLAGE
A. Kelo’s One-Way Street (“Federalism”)
Horton and Levesque say that “federalism is alive and well after Kelo.
Those who extol the virtues of federalism elsewhere should be praising
NELSON & NORCROSS, supra note 96, at 1.
Schnidman, supra note 99, at 3–4.
102
Id. at 4.
103
Id. at 3–4.
104
See Sagalyn, supra note 97, at 168 (describing that even after many delays and lawsuits, the
last phase of condemnation is now complete).
105
So called because the streets are named after astronauts.
106
See Daniela Altimari, Developer Ends Bid to Buy Homes in West Hartford, HARTFORD
COURANT (Sept. 19, 1997), http://articles.courant.com/1997-09-19/news/9709190503_1_commercialsprawl-neighborhood-developer [https://perma.cc/QP9U-GYWT] (describing the developers’
awareness that the project was a “longshot”); Daniela Altimari, Astronaut Village Now Small Sea of
Tranquility, HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 22, 2001), http://articles.courant.com/2001-0822/news/0108220171_1_neighborhood-shopping-mall-target-store
[https://perma.cc/C57C-S46D]
(“Most residents vigorously fought the plan, banding together at town meetings and over kitchen
tables.”).
100
101
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Kelo.” What they ignore is that the Kelo decision is blind to some of the
good work going on in the states with regard to the issues before the court
of what is a public use and what kind of standards and tests the courts
should be using. The Kelo Court offers very little guidance. Indeed, Horton
and Levesque are forced to fall back on Kennedy’s concurring opinion and
argue that it should be the basis for further development of the law in both
the federal and state courts.108
Hathcock is mentioned just once and that is in the dissenting opinion
solely for the purpose of acknowledging that it overturned the Poletown
decision.109 As the discussion above of Hathcock suggests, there is much
that the federal courts, including the High Court, can learn from the states.
Federalism is a two-way street110 and the failure of the U.S. Supreme
Court to recognize the work of the states in its majority opinion is an
affront to federalism. The Court could have, and should have, sampled and
picked from what the sates have done in coping with the sometimesintractable problems of protecting private property rights while advancing
the interests of the general public. That the majority opinion gives the
states no good guidance is not a nod to federalism, but as a failure of
leadership by the Court.
107

B. Show Me the Money (“Compensation”)
In talking about the third word, compensation, Horton and Levesque
argue that if the government had lost in Kelo, it would be encouraged to
expand its use of power thereby damaging property rights without having
to pay any compensation.111 They offer nothing in support of that
speculation, and it is merely that – speculation. The U.S. Supreme Court
has actually limited the more expansive use of regulatory powers,
particularly through exactions and conditions on approvals.112 The Court
has strengthened and perhaps even expanded the reach of the Fifth
Amendment protections for just compensation by finding that it can be
Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1424.
Id. at 1425–27.
109
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
110
See The Roberts Court and Federalism: Minutes from a Convention of the Federalist Society,
4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 330, 367 (2008) (statement of audience participant); see also David L.
Callies, Kelo v. City of New London: Of Planning, Federalism, and a Switch in Time, 28 HAW. L.
REV. 327, 337 (2006) (“The true ‘essence’ of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate
interests which the National Government is bound to respect even though its laws are supreme.”
(quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting))).
111
Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1424–25.
112
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013) (describing
that the exactions tests of Nollan and Dolan extended to money exactions and are applicable even
where the approval is denied because the applicant refuses to accept the condition).
107
108
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used as an affirmative defense to an enforcement action. Most recently,
the Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the so-called relevant
parcel,114 which may prove to be another way by which the Court may
expand its protection of private property rights, especially following what
seems to be the trend with regard to the relevant parcel issue.115 No one
should fear that private property rights would be endangered as a result of
more definitive, and perhaps limiting, rules regarding the use of eminent
domain.
When it comes to compensation, again it is what Horton and Levesque
do not say that is remarkable. They speak not to the need for better
relocation benefits for people who are taken from their homes, for
recognizing the loss of business goodwill, or for addressing how we might
come to entitle private property owners to be compensated for the
assemblage value or at least to be able to participate in part in the
economic upside of committing their private properties to the public
interest for redevelopment by public or private parties. Sometimes, the
justice in just compensation is lacking. They say nothing about the
possibility of attorney’s fees for private property owners who lose their
homes and businesses to the government by eminent domain. They say
nothing about reimbursing private property owners for the real expense of
defending their rights through appraisers and planners and others who can
develop evidence and testify as to value. They say nothing about the need
to balance the scales of justice, to empower the private property owner
through civil Gideon representation and federal and state supported
ombudsmen. These are all issues of compensation and even though
compensation was not an issue before the Court in Kelo, it was the subject
of some discussion during oral argument.116 It is a concern.
Horton and Levesque spend barely half a page on compensation and
two thirds of that is devoted to an argument that property owners should be
glad that they are not subject to losing their property rights by inverse
condemnation because with regulatory takings there is much less chance of
113

113
See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2063 (2013) (explaining that just compensation
is due when taking personal property).
114
See Murr v. State, 859 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 2014), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. 2016)
(stating a claim by Petitioners that regulators forced a merger of their two adjoining Wisconsin
waterfront properties, hindered development, and failed to properly compensate them for the economic
loss they suffered); see also Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (describing the relevant parcel that has been rendered valueless, and holding that a Lucas
categorical taking had occurred).
115
State of Property Rights in America Ten Years After Kelo v. City of New London: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th
Cong. 1 (2015) (testimony of John M. Groen, Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation).
116
Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, 21, 34, 37–38, 40–42, 44, Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
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receiving any compensation. That is not a positive argument for eminent
domain. That also fails to recognize the fundamental problem we have with
inverse condemnation, with both Lucas118 categorical takings and Penn
Central119 partial regulatory takings. I believe that any regulatory activity
that is in the public interest but has adverse off-site impacts, windfarms
and low-level radioactive waste sites for example, should include the
creation of a publically-funded trust fund from which owners of
economically damaged property may get relief, even for relatively small
partial takings. What is lacking in the discourse over both direct takings by
eminent domain and indirect takings by inverse condemnation is
consideration of who bears the burden and how we might make it more
equitable.
117

C. Tyranny by Majority (“Democracy”)
As I read Horton and Levesque, the majority of people in the
community, believing that the interests of “public welfare” will be served,
may if they desire take an individual’s private property, pay just
compensation, and turn it over to a private developer for economic
development, so long as they do so through the “democratic process.” And,
if elected public officials make the decision, the public always has a
remedy in the right to not reelect them.
The first of those two arguments is empty without standards, and
although the authors next turn to pulling Justice Kennedy’s musings up by
their bootstraps to make something useful out of them, the fact remains
that democracy means nothing without the rule of law and Kelo does
nothing to advance the rule of law.120 Horton acknowledged at oral
argument: “It seems to me democracy can make good decisions and . . . or
bad decisions under the Constitution . . . .”121
The second argument, perhaps it can be called “voting the rascals out,”
is, to use another trite phrase, “closing the barn door after the horses are
out.” Neighborhoods destroyed and families irreparably hurt are not
rebuilt and restored at the ballot box.

Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1424–25.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
119
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
120
Dana Berliner characterizes the Court’s decision more strongly, and convincingly, claiming
that it has “remov[ed] the floor from the Public Use Clause” and that Kelo is a “prime example of
judicial abdication.” Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82, 91
(2015).
121
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
117
118
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A More Robust Examination of the Use of Eminent Domain
(Transforming Justice Kennedy’s Test)

Horton and Levesque, though recognizing that Justice Kennedy’s test
is “not well developed,”122 offer to transform it into a ten-part analysis,123
which begins to look more like a detailed legislative enactment than a
judicial test. To demonstrate how intractable trying to do this will be, take
just the first factor: “Will a public body own or operate the property?”124 In
dealing with land assemblage, this really has no meaning. The emergence
of public-private partnerships has wiped out any of the bright lines of
ownership. It matters not who owns or operates a property so long as there
are adequate provisions in place that ensure the assemblage will be used in
the public’s interest. The same problem is inherent in the factor, “how
specific is the state use?”125 Uses change, sometimes quite rapidly, and
frequently before a total plan is implemented. Think of what has happened
in the movie theater business, in big box retail, in the conversion of office
towers to residential use, in warehouses turned into offices. Land uses
today are less permanent and to commit any site, especially a large site, to
a particular land use pattern can be damaging.
What is important about this last section is, again, what is not said. We
need to focus on how we can assemble parcels of land in the public interest
without the use of eminent domain; how we can engage private property
owners as joint venturers in that effort; how we can enable private
entrepreneurs through land assembly and land readjustment laws to create
coalitions of property owners who will voluntarily assemble their land;
how we can allow all private property owners to enjoy the upside of land
assemblage value enhancements; how we can adequately compensate
people who are holdouts and displaced; how we can have a “kinder and
gentler” approach to eminent domain with longer time horizons that enable
some people to stay on in their homes until they are ready to move on; and
how we can empower the small-business owner and single-family
homeowner with the legal and consulting help they need to defend their
private property rights?
If we do all that, and if we provide more definitive rules of law in
constitutional amendments, statutes, and the common law;126 and we
redirect our energies to ways to avoid eminent domain and when it is
necessary to use it, to do so in less damaging ways, then we will all be

Horton & Levesque, supra note 4, at 1426.
Id. at 1426–27.
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Id. at 1426.
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For a good summary of the response to Kelo that may suggest some actions, see Ilya Somin,
The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009).
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better off for it.

127

127
As Professor Bethany Berger so aptly puts it: “In the end the decision in Kelo v. New London
was not a grand victory for the plaintiffs or for New London, for cities or for property owners.”
Bethany Berger, Kelo v. New London: A Decade Later, 94 TITLE NEWS 27, 28 (2015).

